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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS R. COOK, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRISTIANSEN BROS. INC., a 
Utah corporation; MONTMORENCY, 
HAYES & TALBOT ARCHITECTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
MHT ARCHITECTS, INC., a Utah 
corporation; HALVERSON 
PLUMBING & HEATING, INC., 
Defendants/Respondents 
Case No. 860511 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the district court err in finding as a matter of 
law that the alleged negligence of defendants in placing a 
drinking fountain eighteen inches from an oil floor drain in an 
automotive center was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Complaint for personal injury damages was filed in the 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of Utah 
by plaintiff Dennis Cook, against defendants Christiansen 
Brothers, Inc., Montmorency Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc., 
MHT Architects, Inc. and Halverson Plumbing and Heating. 
Montmorency, Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc. filed a 
Third-Party Complaint against third-party defendant Van Boerum 
& Frank Associates, Inc. -4 .. 
Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he was injured in 
a fall at the Sears Automotive Center at the Newgate Mall, 
Ogden, Utah while working as an employee of Sears, Roebuck and 
Company and that the fall was "the proximate result of 
negligent design, construction in and placement of a drinking 
fountain . . . .M (R« 1). Defendant Christiansen Brothers, 
Inc. was the general contractor for the Sears Automotive Center 
at the Newgate Mall (R. 113), defendant Montmorency, Hayes & 
Talbot Architects, Inc. was the project architect (R. 113), 
defendant Halverson Plumbing and Heating was the mechanical 
subcontractor on the project and third-party defendant Van 
Boerum & Frank Associates, Inc. was the mechanical engineer on 
the project. 
By stipulation, plaintiff dismissed without prejudice its 
claims against Halverson Plumbing and Heating. (R. 39-40). 
Plaintiffs claims against defendant MHT Architects, Inc. were 
dismissed on Motion. (R. 74). 
Christiansen Brothers, Inc. and Montmorency, Hayes & 
Talbot Architects, Inc. filed Motions for Summary Judgment 
seeking the dismissal of plaintiffs Complaint. Van Boerum & 
Frank Associates, Inc. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
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pursuant to Rule 14, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, joining in 
the motions of Christiansen Brothers, Inc. and Montmorency, 
Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc. with regard to the dismissal of 
plaintiff's Complaint and also filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment seeking the Dismissal of the Third-Party Complaint. 
The Motions for Summary Judgment were argued before the 
Honorable Judge David E. Roth on August 20, 1986. Judge Roth 
granted defendants' and third-party defendant's Motions for 
Summary Judgment. Summary Judgment was entered in favor of 
defendants and third-party defendant on September 3, 1986. 
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the Summary Judgment 
entered in favor of defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Dennis Cook, was employed by Sears, Roebuck 
& Company as the Assistant Manager of the Sears Newgate Mall 
Automotive Center in Ogden, Utah. (Cook Deposition at 3, 4.) 
It was plaintiff's responsibility to supervise the activities 
of the 15 to 16 mechanics who serviced the 50 to 60 automobiles 
served by the facility each day. (Cook Deposition at 4, 25.) 
The Sears Automotive Center at the Newgate Mall is a 
rectangular facility with service bays along the length of the 
structure on the north and south sides, 10 service bays on each 
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side. (Cook Deposition at 28.) Approximately in the middle of 
the automotive center along the north wall in the immediate 
vicinity of two service bays a water fountain approximately 38 
inches to 40 inches in height was installed next to the wall. 
(Cook Deposition at 5/ 8.) Along the same north wall to the 
east about 18 inches from the easternmost side of the drinking 
fountain was an opening in the concrete floor approximately 12 
inches by 12 inches which was used as a floor drain for 
disposing of engine oil and automatic transmission fluid 
drained from automobiles during servicing. (Cook Deposition at 
5/ 46.) The employees under plaintiff's supervision drained 
engine oil and automatic transmission fluid from automobiles 
into "waste-oil containersM which were about 3-1/2 to 4 feet 
tall with a bucket built on top to catch the oil and other 
fluids as they were drained from automobiles. (Cook Deposition 
at 21.) The containers were capable of storing approximately 
six oil changes. (Cook Deposition at 46.) After a container 
was full, the mechanics would drain the container into the 
floor drain by rolling the container over the floor drain and 
opening a petcock at the bottom of the containers. (Cook 
Deposition at 5, 21, 46.) The mechanics would occasionally 
partially miss the floor drain while emptying the containers, 
spilling oil on the concrete floor around the drain. 
-4-
Generally, the mechanic who dumped the oil would wipe up after 
any spills in the vicinity of the drain and store maintenance 
cleaned the entire shop each evening. (Cook Deposition at 29.) 
The "waste-oil containers" always leaked oil around 
the petcocks and around the seal at the bottom of the 
containers. (Cook Deposition at 9, 21# 47.) Since oil changes 
were done in each of the 20 service bays# the waste-oil 
containers were wheeled throughout the shop area during the 
day. (Cook Deposition at 47.) During portions of the day and 
on each evening the leaky waste-oil containers were stored by 
the mechanics in the area of the drinking fountain and floor 
drain. (Cook Deposition at 9, 21.) 
As in each of the other service bays, the two service 
bays adjacent to the floor drain and drinking fountain 
contained hydraulic racks used for hoisting automobiles. The 
racks were approximately 10 feet from the north wall of the 
structure. (Cook Deposition at 28-29.) The hydraulic racks in 
these bays, as well as in other bays, leaked oil. (Cook 
Deposition at 21.) The two bays adjacent to the floor drain 
and drinking fountain/ as all others, were used for changing 
oil. (Cook Deposition at 55.) Along the same north wall/ 
right next to the area where the floor drain and drinking 
fountain were located, dispensers of 90-weight gear oil and 
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automotive transmission fluid were stored. (Cook Deposition at 
36.) Mechanics would walk over to the area of the floor drain 
to get these dispensers to roll them to the service bays. 
(Cook Deposition at 36.) After use of the dispensers, there 
were some Nseeps" from the dispenser hoses. (Cook Deposition 
at 37.) Also along the same north wall was a stand-up 55 gal. 
drum of 10-40 weight motor oil with a stand-up pump in it. 
(Cook Deposition at 37.) The mechanics would pump the motor 
oil into smaller containers used to add the oil to 
automobiles. (Cook Deposition at 38.) Occasionally, spills of 
oil occurred in this process, although not necessarily on the 
floor. (Cook Deposition at 38.) 
The oil and other automotive fluids and lubricants 
spilled on the floor of the automotive center in the process of 
servicing the 50 to 60 automobiles per day was spread 
throughout the facility. The concrete floor was constructed of 
black diamond concrete and was waxed periodically by store 
maintenance, making it slick. (Cook Deposition at 7, 30, 44.) 
Oil spread very easily on the waxed concrete surface. (Cook 
Deposition at 7.) If a person stepped in any oil, he would 
track the oil throughout the shop. (Cook Deposition at 54.) 
The accident occurred on a Saturday when the shop was 
at its busiest. "There [was] oil all over the floor." (Cook 
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Deposition at 6, 16, 17.) There was oil in each of the bays 
(Cook Deposition at 6) and plaintiff/ in the performance of his 
duties, was Min all of the bays all day long". (Cook 
Deposition at 55.) Plaintiff had oil on the soles of his boots 
from walking through the automotive center. (Cook Deposition 
at 7.) This was "part of the automotive environment". (Cook 
Deposition at 17.) 
Just before noon on November 21/ 1981/ plaintiff 
walked from the service bays to the drinking fountain. (Cook 
Deposition at 30-31/ Exhibit 1 to Cook Deposition.) While he 
was stationary at the northeast corner of the drinking fountain 
getting a drink of water# plaintiff heard one of his men# Tom 
Shock/ call out his name. (Cook Deposition at 31.) Plaintiff 
pivoted on his right foot to turn to face Mr. Shock and 
slipped/ lost his balance/ and fell to the floor striking the 
drinking fountain. (Cook Deposition at 7# 32.) 
There was approximately an 18-inch round spot of oil 
on the floor just off to the east side of the water fountain 
and off to plaintiff's right side as he stood at the drinking 
fountain. (Cook Deposition at 50.) The spot could have come 
from one drop of oil. (Cook Deposition at 50.) Plaintiff is 
uncertain whether the oil came from storage of the leaking 
waste-oil containers in this area# from a mechanic missing the 
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floor drain while emptying the waste-oil containers or possibly 
from oil spilled from surrounding storage tanks (the 10-40 
weight bulk storage tanks or the 90-weight gear oil 
dispenser). (Cook Deposition at 38, 47.) 
Plaintiff used the drinking fountain four to five 
times some days, once or twice on others. (Cook Deposition at 
39.) In the year that he had worked at the automotive center I 
facility prior to the accident, plaintiff had never slipped or 
fallen in the drinking fountain area (Cook Deposition at 39) 
and plaintiff knows of no other persons who have slipped or 
fallen in the drinking fountain area. (Cook Deposition at 
10.) However, other persons had slipped in other areas of the 
shop, but not all the way to the floor. (Cook Deposition at 
10.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Honorable Judge David E. Roth did not err in 
granting defendants' and third-party defendant's Motions for 
Summary Judgment. The undisputed facts as stated in 
plaintiff's deposition are that plaintiff simply slipped and 
fell in an automotive center where oil was present throughout 
when he sought to pivot to face a co-worker. The fortuitous 
fact that plaintiff had just taken a drink at the drinking 
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fountain located 18 inches from a waste-oil floor drain would 
II II I I 1, I K . ' T I N I I ill II I',!1 dl i i ! J 1 1 d i l l I y III II I III J O i l I! I III ILI,!'1 Il I il, I I ' i l i l ' I i ' l / I, IK,,]''!"11 I l l i l l L l l l * 
proximity ot; the drinking fountain in the floon drain was the 
|) r 01 i mat" e c a u s e of I Iio aci i d e n l , I'IIPM-' in IIKI ev i den< e I IMI 
this accident; would have occurred it, I, he drinking fountain had 
been located elsewhere. There is no evidence of the source of: 
II 1 1 1 : ; I III I l l II I I I Ill III I I Ill III I I I I I I I Ill ' III I I I II 1 i Ill' I I I I Jill III III 11 I l i ill Tit iL( III I I 111 I II i ,1 III I I I , 
Only c o n j e c t u r e and speculation would peni.it"' a reasonably 
minded p e r s o n ho conclude that the proximity of the drinking 
fount: a J in IILo I Ii i" I, Loo i, i;I i: an in w a s a cause in, tact uL the 
accid e n t . In sum, an a matter of, law, plaintiff has noIL 
sat i nf i ed hi n hurrlnn to p r e i »' m t In ml' d e f e m l a n t n * • 1 I " IJI I 
negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries. 
Plaintiff" can not create an issue of fact and avoid 
•ii1-. u i i in in <Hi in i | iii,idi. |iiii, jiirll il ] Il mi II mi in i | d i n ii II I mi Illllfi mi I I in II I Ii , i . n i c J i j i s i o n a i ) 
a I legations contradictory of his deposition testimony. To 
perm i t , w i ti horn I adequate exp 1 anat i on an af f i da1' ' 11 
"" I" n t r a d I c t' o i / • 1 d e p o s 11 J o I I t e s 11 m o n y t c > d e f; e a t a M o 11 o n t o r 
Summary Judgment, would d e f e a t t h e p u r p o s e of Ru le b6 Ill .ih 
R u l e s of CM i 1 Procedure I i •• ' I > » P T I i l l . ' . h i i i n i . S . M J H I ; Il I  -I . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS CORRECTLY GRANTED 
WHERE ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS BEFORE 
THE COURT NO REASONABLY MINDED PERSON 
COULD FIND DEFENDANTS' ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE 
WAS THE CAUSE IN FACT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
FALL AND INJURIES WITHOUT RESORTING TO 
SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE. 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment were granted 
because on the undisputed facts contained in plaintiff's 
deposition/ defendants' alleged negligence in the placement of 
the drinking fountain 18 inches from the floor drain was not 
the proximate cause of plaintiff's fall and injuries as a 
matter of law. Judge Roth stated: 
The facts, apparently undisputed facts, are 
that the Plaintiff simply slipped and fell 
in a garage area. Had oil on his shoes. 
There was oil on the floor. Apparently oil 
all over the area of the garage. 
The Plaintiff claims that the causation or 
proximate causation of the accident was the 
negligent design and construction whereby 
the sump was located within 18 inches of the 
water fountain. I don't buy the argument. 
I don't think the sump location and the 
water fountain location being 18 inches 
apart is the cause of this accident. 
Transcript on Appeal at 2, Addendum 1. 
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Causation (often referred to as iproxirfiate causal ion) 
an essent i a I element r 1' a meg I igence acl: J on ,  1 s compr iseci of 
two components: (II) causation in f a "I ; < n ,1 (I) proximate or 
leiqa 1 oviiisal" Kin , W i l l i a i i s ..v l e j j j y „ h4 I1 I" ""tl i /"" I * .-""it (III ah 
1985). Conduct is the cause in fart: of, injury it it is .i 
material element arid a substantial factor 'in bringing i I 
a b o I , I ioks,SfM Law uL 1 o r I s 4 III I I>! 'Ill, (III11 ' Ill) Il „., 'Ill; See, Dunn 
v, McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P,2d 894, 896 (Utah 
1 9 7 8 ) ^ c a i J ,! J 0" i in in I .11 '" I i,' I. t" h P c a mi i,«»c» "l"" w i If 1111111 w 11 I <" I" i I III' i *li i i;i s 11 III I: 
[ i n j u r y J woo nil not. ill! i i," oocun teel' mi i i i m ' l i n o I I v . Pearson 
Will ip.r ise.s, 697 P 2d 240, 245 (llt'aih 1985) , Proximate oi ' leqai 
i "anJ'n at , ;i o n i ,• i II, i i r LI"! in II i, ill i I a IL i ; I I HI o 'aL i i aa lL ion , / I n c h i o q m i i. o:» 
t;hat" the cause in f acf, have produced the i n jury i, n t he " natui: 11 
and continuous .sequence (unbroken by any efficient interveni ng 
cause) , " " III ("I i in eft iclenll' ,i in lie i: veiling cause i s a subsequent; 
cause which is a l so a cause in fac t of the i n j u r y , tun I which 
wi njii III ill in Il l i in II in M r i s n r i i i h I \ ' lll'ii M I II o r o s f o n lllliy II III Il i in s I am I i»i , 
Hillvard v. Utah By-Products Co., i Utah 2d 1,4 3, 2 63 P. 2d 287 
2 91 (1953)/ overruled on other grounds Il I a i, r i s . y_t Utah Transit 
Authority , Il  III11 " i l l / Ill" " ""„„"" (III! Ill" Il in \ ) , „ III J e i j e d n e y I i IJIPIII "v 
must be the actual catiae or cause in fact ot irviury before it 
can be the proximate or legaj. uaase oi x 
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Ordinarily, the issue of proximate causation should 
not be decided as a matter of law on a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, supra at 245. 
However, this Court has recognized that Min appropriate 
circumstances summary judgment may be granted on the issue of 
proximate cause", id.; Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co.. 611 P.2d 363, 365 (Utah 1980). This is 
particularly so when plaintiff has failed to present a triable 
issue on cause in fact. This Court has consistently held over 
the years that summary judgment is appropriate on the issue of 
proximate causation if from the undisputed facts reasonably 
minded jurors could find that the alleged negligence was the 
cause in fact of the alleged injury only through conjecture and 
speculation. Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, supra; Staheli 
v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 
1982); Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 
680 (1943). See, Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
It Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, supra, this Court 
affirmed the entry of summary judgment on the issue of 
proximate cause in a wrongful death action brought by the heirs 
of a businessman murdered in his room at the Salt Lake Hilton 
Hotel. Although there was sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that the hotel had been negligent in providing security 
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for * < guest^ the p h y s i c a l ev idence r» upper tied at leas 1 t h r e e 
iv s c e n a r i o s as tu lniw g la i lit 111 u " i ili-nl met 
Lis de^i t HI more of which would n<d have been prevented 
^pquat-p el st1) II i i \ i I .11 ell 
Demonstrating material issues of fact with 
respect to defendants' negligence is not 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment i f 
there is no evidence that establishes a 
direct causal connection between that 
alleged negligence and the injur y 
1 n t: h i s case, p 1 a :i nt i f f s f a i 1 ed to ma ke out 
a case based on the specific acts of alleged 
negligence because there is an absence of 
proof that the alleged negligence was the 
proximate cause of Mitchell's death. 
697 p.2d at 245, This Coin;I -M.sed in Mitchell fn permit 
'• |JC"M mi 1 i l l ii ill I in mi r i n j e t I LI i c I ::):i i II 1 >> 
ev i dence . I' Ii i s Conr i s t a t; ed : 
As thi s Coin t: sal d in Staheli v> Farmers' 
Cooperative of Southern Utah: "When the 
proximate cause of an injury is left to 
speculation, the cl ai m fails as a matter of 
law". Therefore, since any attempt to 
relate Mitchell's death to the alleged 
negligence of the hotel in providing 
adequate security would be completely 
speculative, summary judgment was pre 
that cause of action. 
697 P.2d at 248. 
.13 .  
In Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah, 
supra, the case quoted by this Court in Mitchell, plaintiffs 
sought recovery for grain they had entrusted to defendant for 
storage which was destroyed in a fire at the storage 
warehouse. The actual cause of the fire was unknown. The 
possibilities included arson, spontaneous combustion, 
negligence of the defendant, negligence of the plaintiffs or 
their assignors, or the negligence of transients. 655 P.2d at 
682. Recognizing that it could not speculate as to the most 
likely cause of the fire, this Court affirmed the trial court's 
decision in part upon the grounds that proximate cause had not 
been established as a matter of law. 655 P.2d at 684. 
In Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., supra, the 
plaintiff engaged defendant to tow his automobile to a garage 
for repairs. As the tow truck pulled into traffic with 
plaintiff's automobile in tow, plaintiff's automobile was 
struck from behind by a skidding coal truck. The only alleged 
negligence of the defendant was his failure to give an arm 
signal before proceeding into traffic. This Court held, in 
affirming a non-suit at the close of the plaintiff's case, that 
while there was sufficient evidence of negligence, there was 
not a triable issue of proximate case. There was no evidence 
-14-
t h a t t h e q n M nq of an arm s i g n a l woiixu UUYO ^ e v e n t e d t h e 
ace i d e n t . Il Ii i M "L on i I, K La Led i 
While deductions may be based on 
probabilities, the evidence must do more 
than merely raise a conjecture or show a 
probability. Where there are probabilities 
the other way equally or more potent the 
deductions are mere guesses and the jury 
should not be permitted to speculate. The 
rule is well established in this 
jurisdiction that where "the proximate cause 
of the injury is left to conjecture, the 
plaintiff must fail as a matter of law* 
[citations deleted]. Many cases are cited 
:i n support of this proposition, and the court: 
quoted with approval from 29 Cyc. 625 where 
it stated: "The evidence must/ however, do 
more than merely raise a conjecture or show 
a probability as to the cause of the injury, 
and no recovery can be had if the evidence 
leaves it to conjecture which of two 
probable causes resulted in the injury, 
where defendant was liable for only one 
them." 
132 P. 2d .it liM I 
This Court's pi mi decisions are consistent with 
Professor Piosser's L z e a t i s P I H I the 1 aw o f t o r t s , P r o s s e r, Law 
u i . j i t s , ' I I I  I'M II '"I » II i i ! '" II II «.l .ii I P I M 
On the issue o f t he £ a c t o f c au s a t i o n, a s :: ii 
other issues essential to his cause of 
action for neqliqence, the plaintiff, :i n 
qeneral, has the burden of proof. He mi ist: 
introduce evidence which affords a 
reasonable basis for the conclusion that it 
is moIP likp-v • I, dot that the conduct of 
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the defendant was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the result. A mere 
possibility of such causation is not enough; 
and when the matter remains one of pure 
speculation or conjecture/ or the 
probabilities are at best evenly balanced, 
it becomes the duty of the court to direct a 
verdict for the defendant. 
In the case at bar# the evidence offered by plaintiff 
as to the facts of this accident would not permit reasonably 
minded jurors to find that it is more probable than not that 
defendants' alleged negligence in locating the drinking 
fountain 18 inches from the floor drain was a substantial cause 
of plaintiff's injuries. It is undisputed that the concrete 
floor was waxed and slippery even without the presence of oil. 
(Cook Deposition at 7, 30, 44.) It is further undisputed that 
there was oil all over the shop the day of the accident (Cook 
Deposition at 6, 16) from leaking hydraulic racks in each of 
the service bays (Cook Deposition at 21)/ from leaking 
waste-oil containers (Cook Deposition at 5/ 21/ 46)/ from a 
seeping 90-weight gear oil dispenser (Cook Deposition at 37) , 
and from oil changes occurring in each of the bays of the 
automotive center (Cook Deposition at 55). The following 
testimony summarizes the conditions in the automotive center on 
the day of the accident: 
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Q. Did you have any other spillages of oil 
down in that area? 
A.' Well/ inasmuch as :i t was a Saturday, 
<• there i s oil all over the floor By 
the hole, there is usually oil or 
antifreeze in each of the bays in * 
auto center, (Cook Deposition at 
* * * * * 
Q. The floor was slippery iu uv*~ H.me T 
guess? 
A Well, a floor in any shop - - it doesn't 
matter where it is — is always slick. 
It doesn't matter where you are, the 
least bit of oil or antifreeze 3 s 
slick. It doesn't really matter what 
part of the shop you are in there's 
always something on the floor. 
And 5 oi 1 always have something s*. 
then on your boots, then I guess? 
A^ Yes, I would say so. That's alrno^ 
part of the automotive environment 
There is always oil. (Cook Depos^ , n 
at 16- 1 7.) 
It IN IJ fid 1 IS pill t e d t h a i p J a n i l l ' w a s nnf- n s i p n i-ho 
d r i n k i n g f o u n t a i n when he f e l l . (Cook • • ;>*. v t ; -n a t 31 • 
P i a j r i t i f f was nnl b e n d i n g nvpr MIP r l f i n k i n q f o u n t a i f i in n priiim 
o r in 11 b a l a n c e d c o n d i t i o n when he t e l l H m I" D e p o s i t i o n -it 
\l I P l a i n t i f f d i d n o t ; e v e n I n n , Ill iilllnl I t h e d r i n k i n g f o u n t a i n 
w h e n I u 1 s i" a r I en I I I ni I  I 11 H I|I I  i ^ p i 1 \ i I 1 HII nil 1 I  ) I  IK- 11 I y 
connection the drinking fountain had hi lliii'i accident i,s the 
fortuitous fact that plaintiff had just finishing getting a 
drink at the fountain when he pivoted around to respond to a 
co-worker and lost his balance in the course of his pivot. 
(Cook Deposition at 7, 31-32.) 
While there was oil on the floor to the right of the 
drinking fountain, plaintiff does not know whether that oil 
resulted from the emptying of the waste-oil containers into the 
floor drain, or from the fact that the plaintiff and his 
mechanics stored the leaking waste-oil containers near the 
drinking fountain all night and at times during the day. 
Plaintiff testified as follows: 
Q. The oil that was in the area of the 
drinking fountain on the day of your 
accident could have come from those 
leaking tanks? 
A. From the leaking tanks or possibly they 
could have missed the drain a little 
bit too. 
(Cook Deposition at 47.) In fact, plaintiff could not say 
whether the oil on the floor near the drinking fountain had 
"seeped" from the 90-weight gear oil dispenser or had been 
spilled from the 10-40 weight bulk storage tank, both of which 
were stored by plaintiff and his mechanics along the wall in 
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the area of cue aiiiiKj.iiy fountain. Plaintiff testified HS 
Okay. Are you positive that the oil 
that you slipped on came from someone 
trying to deposit oil in the drain as 
opposed to someone who spilt oil from 
the surrounding storage tanks? 
We 11 , a s I remembe r , when 1 g o t 11 [, i 11 
was dirty because my clothes were 
dirty. It was dirty oil. 
Well/ the other oil — the oil that: 
comes out of the storage tanks — once 
its on the floor, does it still appear 
clean? 
I HI not an expert on that. * ~~~ w 
know. 
(Conk Depos i t i on at in ) Indeed, It is iqi i i i l ly p robab le thai 
the (ill neai I he d r i n lunq foun ta in Uiiii I! i nicked by pldinl i(f ni 
MI In in mucluiii 11 ,"» t I'OIII o t he r a r e a s ot I lie Jiup, I I is undisputed 
that due to I.lit* wax IUI the c o n c r e t e f looi , the o i l war. spread 
wide 1 y in in '| mi in i i rif 1 mi I III' I M I 1 c s i i II mi M M i t « i i i I I i i w « 
Q. ....xd you have some oi 1 mi II IIIi*• M I I *•»; I 
^our boots that day? 
A. I m sure just walking through the auto 
center I would have oil or something on 
:ii t: (Cc •< k Deposition at: 7 ) ' '";; 
* * * * * 
f> ::)] 1 ows: 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
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Q. I have a few more. If you would have 
approached the fountain at the front of 
the fountain as opposed to at the 
side — at that corner as you described 
it/ would you have had your feet in the 
vicinity of spilled oil? 
A. I may have, I don't know. Now, as you 
know as well as I do, anybody that even 
touches oil is going to track it with 
them. So any residual oil is going to 
be there — oil tracks all over the 
place. 
Q. Right. 
A. Like one drop will spread 6 inches so—. 
(Cook Deposition at 54.) 
The cause of plaintiff's injury was oil and lots of it 
everywhere and from many sources. To use plaintiff's own 
words, the cause of his injury was the "automotive 
environment. There is always oil." (Cook Deposition at 17.) 
It was not caused by the proximity of the drinking fountain to 
the floor drain. Plaintiff admits that a drinking fountain 
located anywhere in the shop would be surrounded by oil residue 
tracked by the mechanics. Plaintiff testified as follows: 
Q. So everyone has oil on the bottom of 
their soles regardless of where you put 
the drinking fountain you're going to 
have oil residue in front of the 
drinking fountain, are you not? 
A. That's why I said they shouldn't have 
done a fountain there period. Well, 
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anywhere that you put the — well, if 
the fountain was in the customer 
waiting area there wouldn't have been 
oil up there. 
Q. So you're saying there shouldn't have 
been any drinking fountain in any part 
of the auto shop itself? 
A. I don't think I would put one there 
when I made the store. 
(Cook Deposition at 54-55.) Plaintiff even admits that he was 
required to be in the vicinity of the floor drain during the 
working day to fulfill his duties and responsibilities/ 
notwithstanding the location of the water fountain. Plaintiff 
testified as follows: 
Q. Other than in your supervisory 
capacity, did you periodically go to 
each of the bays during the day? 
A. During the day I was in all the bays 
all day long depending on the 
workload. If it was extremely busy, I 
tried to help the people in the shop as 
much as I could. 
Q. So even if the drinking fountain hadn't 
been in the location that it was, you 
still would have been in the vicinity 
of that oil during the day; is that 
correct? 
A. I would say so, yeh. But everybody is. 
Q. Okay. 
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A. There is always a certain amount of oil 
on the floor. 
(Cook Deposition at 55-56.) 
It is not insignificant that during the year preceding 
this accident, after using the drinking fountain between one 
and five times a day, the plaintiff never thought that the 
proximity of the drinking fountain to the floor drain was a 
dangerous situation. (Cook Deposition at 39.); Cf., Webster 
v. Sill, supra. 
Judge Roth's entry of summary judgment for defendants 
should be affirmed for the reason he stated in his ruling, "it 
would be a waste of time to send this case to trial". 
Transcript on Appeal at 2, Addendum 1. A triable issue of fact 
arises only when reasonable minds could disagree. Hall v. 
Blackham. 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664, 666 (1966). On the 
facts submitted by plaintiff, all reasonable minds must agree 
that plaintiff has not shown it more probable than not that the 
location of the drinking fountain was a substantial factor in 
causing this accident. To decide for plaintiff on the issue of 
causation in fact, a juror would be required to speculate that: 
(1) plaintiff was somehow more vulnerable to slipping 
in oil because he had just completed getting a drink of water 
from the drinking fountain; and 
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(2) the oil on the floor near the drinking fountain 
was from oil which had missed the floor drain during the 
emptying of the waste-oil containers and was not from a leaking 
waste-oil container left near the drinking fountain/ a seeping 
90-weight gear oil dispenser, a spill from the 10-40 weight 
bulk storage tank, the leaking of the hydraulic racks in the 
bays ten feet to the south or from oil tracked on the soles of 
mechanic's shoes from the bays where oil changes and other 
servicing was occurring. This Court has repeatedly held that 
jurors ought not be permitted to engage in such speculation and 
conjecture. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT CREATE A TRIABLE 
ISSUE OF FACT BY FILING AN AFFIDAVIT 
CONTAINING CONCLUSIONARY ALLEGATIONS 
IN CONTRADICTION OF PLAINTIFF'S PRIOR 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
Recognizing the failure of the facts presented by 
plaintiff in his deposition to present a triable issue on 
proximate cause, plaintiff's counsel filed at the time of the 
hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment an affidavit of 
plaintiff which contradicted the clear and unequivocal 
testimony quoted above with the following conclusionary 
allegations: 
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2. On November 21, 1981, I was injured by 
a fall while using a drinking fountain 
at Sears Automotive Center in Ogden, 
Utah. 
3. The injury would not have happened but 
for the fact that the drinking fountain 
and oil drain were placed so close to 
each other than an accident was 
inevitable. 
4. I believe the poor placement of the 
drinking fountain next to the oil drain 
was the principal cause of my injury. 
(R. 148). 
This Court stated in Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984) that: 
A major purpose of summary judgment is to 
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the 
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue to present 
to the fact finder. In accordance with this 
purpose, specific facts are required to show 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. 
The allegations of a pleading or factual 
conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient 
to raise a genuine issue of fact. 
Similarly, in Webster v. Sill, supra at 1172, this Court stated: 
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an 
affidavit must do more than reflect the 
affiant's opinions and conclusions." Walker 
v. Rocky Mountain Recreation, 29 Utah 2d 
274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). The affidavit 
must Mset forth specific facts1' showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Utah R. 
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Civ.P. 56(e). The mere assertion that an 
issue of fact exists without a proper 
evidentiary foundation to support that 
assertion is insufficient to preclude the 
granting of a summary judgment motion. 
Leininaer v. Stearns Rogers Mfg., 17 Utah 2d 
37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965); Foster v. Steed, 19 
Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60 (1967). 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the affidavit of plaintiff are 
clearly conclusionary and insufficient to raise a genuine issue 
of fact. Each of the above quoted paragraphs is contradictory 
of plaintiffs prior deposition testimony. In Webster v. Sill, 
supra, this Court stated that a party may not raise an issue of 
fact by an affidavit which contradicts previous deposition 
testimony unless it appears to some substantial likelihood that 
the deposition testimony was in error for reasons which appear 
in the deposition or an adequate explanation for the 
contradiction is contained in the affidavit. 675 P2d at 
1172-73. In this case, plaintiff has not explained the 
contradictions between his affidavit and deposition testimony 
and, while correcting other testimony, plaintiff did not change 
his deposition testimony when preparing his errata sheet. This 
Court must, therefore, disregard paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of 
plaintiffs affidavit. As this Court recognized in Webster v. 
Sill, "[a] contrary rule would undermined the utility of 
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summary judgment as a means of screening out sham issues of 
fact." 675 P.2d at 1173. 
CONCLUSION 
The Honorable Judge David E. Roth's Summary Judgment 
in favor of defendants and third-party defendant should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this Y_ day of March, 1987. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
CraigTRT MaViger,' Esq 
u 
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ADDENDUM 
Transcript on Appeal, Summary Judgment hearing, 
August 20, 1986. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
DENNIS COOK, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CHRISTIANSON BROTHERS 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al, 
Defendant 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
Civil No. 94076 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came 
on for hearing before the HON. DAVED E. ROTH, Judge of the 
above entitled Court, sitting without a Jury, on August 20, 
1986. 
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had, to wit: 
A p p e a r a n c e s ; 
JACK HELGESEN, ESQ., 
Attorney for Plaintiff; 
RAYMOND BERRY, ESQ., 
Attorney for Defendant 
THE COURT: I am going to grant the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. — 
The facts, apparently undisputed facts, are that the 
Plaintiff simply slipped and fell in a garage area. Had 
oil on his shoes. There was oil on the floor. Apparently 
oil all over the area of the garage. 
The Plaintiff claims that the causation or proximate 
causation of the accident was the negligent design and 
construction whereby the sump was located within 18 inches 
of the water fountain. I don't buy the argument. I don't 
think the sump location and the water fountain location 
being 18 inches apart is the cause of this accident. Citing 
specifically the Cook vs. Mortenson case, I believe this 
most appropriately is in line with the facts in this case 
supporting the decision. I think it would be a waste of 
time to send this case to trial. 
MR. BERRY: Thank you, your Honor. Should I 
prepare the Order? 
THE COURT: Get together between the four of you 
and decide who prepares the Order. Circulate it among 
all parties. 
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Construction, Inc., et al, on August 20, 1986. 
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page 2, constitutes a full, true and correct transcript of 
Judge Rothes ruling in the above entitled matter. 
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